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When seeking to obtain information helpful to their clients, attorneys
have a variety of devices available. Some are formal discovery devices like
interrogatories, depositions, subpoenas, and document requests. Other
devices, such as freedom of information requests, exist independent of
litigation but still provide valuable methods of obtaining information to
assist the client. One such information-discovering device is the request of
a shareholder to inspect corporate records.
Courts have long recognized that certain individuals have the right to
inspect corporate books and records. Indeed, common law courts recognized
that three different classes of persons had the right to inspect corporate
books and records:' shareholders, directors, and members of nonstock
corporations.2 Like other states,3 Oklahoma has codified these rights,4 which
provide convenient methods to obtain information from a corporation. For
litigators, these rights offer a method to supplement discovery motions to
gain additional information for derivative suits.' For transactional attorneys,
* Associate, Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P., Tulsa, Oklahoma. J.D.,
2001, University of Arkansas School of Law; B.A., 1998, Lyon College.
I. See Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 671 A.2d 874, 876 (Del. Ch. 1994).
2. Id.
3. See 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2213 (perm ed., rev. vol, 1995); see also Note, "Proper Purpose"
for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DUKE L.J. 393, 393 [hereinafter Proper
Purpose]; Brian C. Griffin, Note, Shareholders'Inspection Rights, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 616, 617
(1977) (noting that all fifty states have enacted statutes recognizing this right).
4. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065 (2001). In enacting section 1065 of title 18, the Oklahoma
legislature adopted the Delaware codification of these rights. See id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220 (2001). Because members ofnonstock corporations have rights that are similar to
shareholders in this context, the author makes no effort to distinguish between the two.
5. See Rales v. Blansbad, 634 A.2d 927, 934-35 n.10 (Del. 1993); see also 2 F. HODGE
O'NEAL& ROBERTB. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7:35,
at 227 (2d ed. 1991); Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring and Corporate
Management By Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 331, 359 (1996).
Assuming that the corporation cooperates, these requests could supplement discovery and save
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these rights offer access to information necessary to correspond with the
shareholders of a target company, often a prerequisite for obtaining control
in the context of mergers and acquisitions.6 Similarly, these inspection
rights are critical for securities attorneys conducting due diligence in hostile
situations.
This article will examine the inspection rights of both shareholders and
directors under Oklahoma law in an effort to inform Oklahoma attorneys of
another weapon they may use in their quest to obtain corporate information.
Because the genesis of Oklahoma law lies in Delaware law, this article
explores Delaware law to ascertain both the approach Oklahoma courts will
likely take and the authority that Oklahoma courts will likely find
persuasive.
Part I concentrates on the shareholder's right to inspect corporate
documents, including the rationale for providing this right, its statutory
development, its origin in current Oklahoma law, and common limitations
on this right. Part III examines statutory limitations on the right to inspect
corporate documents. Part IV concentrates on the director's right to inspect
corporate documents, including its rationale and its application under both
Oklahoma and Delaware law. Part V examines the issue of whether a
corporation must create documents in response to a request by a shareholder
an attorney's time and his client's money. If the corporation insists on litigating a request by
a shareholder or director, these cost benefits may evaporate. See Thomas, supra, at 360 (noting
that Delaware attorneys estimate fees for simple stocklist cases to run around $10,000, fees for
straightforward books and records cases to run around $20,000-50,000, and fees for more
complex, contested cases to be significantly greater).
Ifthe corporation litigates the matter in bad faith, however, the inspecting party may recover
attorneys' fees either by statute or via the bad faith exception to the American rule. See id. at
366; see also McGowan v. Empress Entm't Inc., 791 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2000). In McGowan,
a director made a lawful demand, and although the company had promised orally and in writing
to provide the documents, it did not. This action enabled the director to recover his attorneys'
fees for the action to compel inspection under the bad faith exception to the American rule that
each party bears his own fees. McGowan, 791 A.2d at 5.
For a thorough discussion of the distinction between the right of inspection and the right
of discovery during litigation, see 5A FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2213, at 335.
6. Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 393 (noting that such correspondence is necessary for
the three primary means of corporate acquisition: proxy contests, public exchange offers, and
cash tender offers). Because the incumbent officers who have an interest in the corporation's
continued existence have physical custody of the documents, companies rarely turn over these
documents after a single request, and parties often must seek judicial enforcement. See id. at





or director. Finally, Part VI lists factors for practitioners to evaluate in
determining whether to use this newly acquired weapon.
11. Shareholder's Right of Inspection
A. Rationale
All states recognize the shareholder's right of inspection.7 Two general
theories support this right,8 both arising from the fundamental notion that
shareholders own the corporation. First, the "agency" theory explains that
shareholders own the corporation and that rights of inspection protect the
shareholders' investments in the company.9 As the United States Supreme
Court noted, "The right of inspection rests upon the proposition that those
in charge of the corporation are merely the agents of the stockholders, who
are the real owners of the property."'0 Oklahoma courts hold that the
statutory right to inspect corporate documents is an incident of stock
ownership."
A second, related theory also supports the shareholder's right of
inspection. The "watchdog" theory explains that inspection rights exist to
protect shareholders who, after entrusting their property interests in a
company to its agents, must "keep a watchful eye on the management and
the condition of the business."' 2 Indeed, one Oklahoma Supreme Court
Justice has referred to the shareholder's right of inspection as "the assertion
of a right to know the full scope of corporate activity."' 3  To enable
shareholders to monitor corporate activities more efficiently, one scholar has
advocated broadening and streamlining shareholder inspection statutes.' 4
Morever, some scholars advocate shareholder monitoring, at least by
institutional shareholders, under the theory that such monitoring will
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Thomas, supra note 5, at 337; Griffin, supra note 3, at 616.
9. See generally Thomas, supra note 5, at 336; Griffin, supra note 3, at 616.
10. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905).
11. Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co., 1948 OK 1, 14, 189 P.2d 929, 932; see also 5A
FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2230, at 438; cf Ramco Operating Co. v. Gasset, 1995 OK 8, 8,
890 P.2d 941, 943 (holding that pledgee lacked such common law rights).
12. 5A FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2213, at 336; see also Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 155 (noting
that "oftentimes frauds are discoverable only by examination of the books").
13. Gassett, 9, 890 P.2d at 947 (Opala, J., dissenting).
14. Thomas, supra note 5, at 369 (concluding that the SEC should amend SEC Rule 14a-7
if no state law reform takes place).
2003]
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Before the seventeenth century, courts regarded corporations as trustees
holding corporate property for the benefit of the shareholders.' 7 During the
industrial revolution, the development of the modem corporation led English
common law courts to recognize the shareholder's right to inspect corporate
books to protect property interests. 8
At common law, shareholders had the right to inspect corporate books and
records for a proper purpose at a reasonable place and time. 9 Today, this
common law rule exists in the absence of legislative abrogation or an
enactment by the corporation in its bylaws or charter.20 Indeed, courts hold
that modern statutes codifying common law inspection rights supplement
rather than abrogate these rights.2 ' The common law rule established
shareholders' inspection rights as qualified rights that shareholders may
assert in good faith, after establishing the inspection's proper purpose.22
Procedurally, common law courts required that a dispute or controversy
exist before granting the right of inspection and, even then, circumscribed
the inspections granted depending on the purposes of the particular dispute.23
15. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991).
16. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark
Side ofRelational Investing, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 987 (1994).
17. Thomas, supra note 5, at 336-37.
18. Id. at 337.
19. Ramco Operating Co. v. Gassett, 1995 OK 8, 8, 890 P.2d 941, 943 (noting that the
common law right was personal to the stockholder; thus, the court denied a pledgee the right of
inspection); see also 5AFLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2214, at 342; 2 O'NEAL& THOMPSON, supra
note 5, § 7:35, at 228; Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 394.
20. 5A FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2214, at 342.
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257 (Del. 1926); see
also Griffin, supra note 3, at 617 (noting that shareholders still have the common law right to
inspect documents lying beyond the scope of state inspection statutes). But see Gassett, 8, 890
P.2d at 943 ("Statutes were later adopted to include and enlarge upon the common law
inspection rights."). As its statement in Gassett reveals, the Oklahoma Supreme Court views
statutes as including and enlarging on common law inspection rights; thus, it may hold that the
Oklahoma inspection statute either included or abrogated common law rights.
22. 5A FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2214, at 342; see also Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at
394.




Shareholders asking courts to enforce their inspection rights also had to
allege and prove a proper purpose for their inspection. 4
In the 1800s, the increasing size and complexity of corporations resulted
in problems of corporate finance and production, and led to an increase not
only in the number of shareholders, but also in the shareholders' need for
reliable information about corporate affairs.2 5 As shareholders were
progressively less involved in corporate management and less likely to have
convenient access to corporate business information, shareholders turned to
corporate law to gain this information.26 Corporate statutes in the early
1800s dealt with this problem in two ways: (1) by granting shareholders
inspection rights, and (2) by requiring the corporation to report to its
shareholders periodically.
27
Often, corporate officers resisted inspection by minority shareholders, and
this resistance led to growing dissatisfaction with the common law rule.2, In
the latter part of the nineteenth century, this dissatisfaction caused many
states to enact statutes to provide a right of inspection in "unqualified
terms. 29 These statutes neither made a proper purpose a condition of
inspection nor allowed companies to deny shareholder access, even on
grounds of an improper or illegal purpose.3 ° By the early 1900s, many state
statutes also provided for sanctions against a company and its officials for
refusing shareholder requests for information, even when the shareholder
made unreasonable demands."
A variety of common law forms allowed shareholders to exercise their
rights to inspect, including: mandamus at law, mandatory injunction in
equity, animation-before-trial, and discovery-and-inspection.32 For a time,
courts limited inspection rights by procedural means. For example, in some
courts, the remedy for refusal of inspection was to seek a writ of
1086 (K.B. 1831); Regina v. Saddlers' Co., 10 Week. Rptr. 87 (C.P. 1861).
24. Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 394.
25. Thomas, supra note 5, at 338.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 395.
29. Id. Delaware's statute is a good example of such legislation. Id. at 395 n. 14 (quoting
36 Del. Laws ch. 135, § 15 (1929), which states, "'The original or duplicate stock ledger...
shall, at all times, during the usual hours of business, be open to the examination of every
stockholder ... ') (second alteration in original).
30. Id. at 395.
31. Thomas, supra note 5, at 339.
32. Id.
2003]
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mandamus.33 As courts considered writs of mandamus discretionary,
extraordinary remedies, they refused to issue the extraordinary writs when
the shareholder's motive or purpose was improper.34 Delaware courts,
among others, followed this approach."
Delaware's procedural formalities for obtaining writs of mandamus
required courts to consider as true undenied allegations in the writ, but if the
response denied the allegations, then Delaware courts considered the denial
to be true and refused to issue a writ.36 Practically, Delaware courts held that
they lacked authority to reach the merits of the writ, so merely by alleging
an improper purpose, corporations could defeat a shareholder's "absolute"
right of inspection." The Delaware legislature responded by amending the
mandamus procedure to allow Delaware courts to examine the facts of each
request to ascertain the propriety of an inspection demand.38
The unlimited right of inspection led to abuses, such as companies
purchasing stock of their competitors to access corporate information or to
blackmail the competitor.39 These abuses produced legislative backlash and,
in the 1930s, resulted in "a statutory movement back toward the common
law's limitations on shareholders' inspection rights."4
Modem corporate inspection statutes abandon the absolute language of
their predecessors and expressly require a minimal showing of a proper
purpose.4' Although state statutes differ in the terms and inspection rights
33. See Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 395; see also Thomas, supra note 5, at 342
(noting Delaware followed this approach).
34. See Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 395 (citing Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148,
155 (1905); State ex rel. Costelo v. Middlesex Banking Co., 88 A. 861 (Conn. 1913); Shea v.
Sweetser, I I I A. 579 (Me. 1920); Bruning v. Hoboken Printing and Publ'g Co., 50 A. 907 (N.J.
1902)). Other courts held that because inspection was an absolute right, no discretion existed
to deny the writ of mandamus. Id. (citing Venner v. Chi. City Ry., 92 N.E. 643 (111. 910); State
ex rel. Dempsey v. Werra Aluminum Foundry Co., 182 N.W. 354 (Wis. 1921)); see also
Thomas, supra note 5, at 338; C. Thomas Attix, Jr., Note, Rights of Equitable Owners of
Corporate Shares, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 999, 1000 (1951); William T. Blackburn, Comment,
Shareholder Inspection Rights, 12 Sw. L.J. 61, 61 (1958).
35. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257 (Del. 1926); State
ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 115 A. 773 (Del. 1922).
36. Proper Purpose, supra note 3, at 396.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 396-97 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 156 A. 170 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931),
as an example of a court applying the amended statute).
39. Thomas, supra note 5, at 339; see also Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in
Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 331 (1937).
40. Thomas, supra note 5, at 339; Blackburn, supra note 34, at 61.




conferred, the majority of modem corporate statutes grant the right of
inspection only to qualified shareholders making written demand for
inspection at a reasonable time for a proper purpose. 2 Some state statutes
limit the statutory inspection rights to those shareholders who either were
shareholders of record for six months prior to the demand or hold a
minimum of 5% of the outstanding stock. 3
Furthermore, some modem statutes differentiate between requests based
on the information sought. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
for example, divides the shareholder right of inspection into two categories
depending on the information sought. If a shareholder seeks the articles of
incorporation, bylaws, lists of officers and directors, or the most recent
annual report, the shareholder can access these materials without any
showing of purpose." If a shareholder seeks the shareholders list,
accounting records, or excerpts from directors' meetings, a shareholder must
show that his demand is made in good faith, for a proper purpose, and that
the records sought are directly connected to his purpose. 5
Practitioners should note that although modern inspection statutes are the
most common vehicle for exercising inspection rights, common law
inspection rights may remain viable. 6 Whether the Oklahoma Supreme
Court would determine that shareholders retain common law inspection
rights not codified in the Oklahoma General Corporation Act47 is uncertain.
In the case of Ramco Operating Co. v. Gassett,4 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court examined the history of common law inspection rights and their
subsequent codification, before determining that a pledgee of stock lacked
such rights that were personal to shareholders. 9 In reaching this conclusion,
the court stated that "[s]tatutes were later adopted to include and enlarge
upon the common law inspection rights."5 The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
therefore, views inspection statutes as including and enlarging common law
inspection rights and, thus, could hold that the Oklahoma inspection statute
either included or abrogated common law rights.
42. 5A FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2215, at 348.
43. See 2 O'NEAL& THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 7:35, at 229. Oklahoma does not take this
approach. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065 (2001).
44. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (1984); see also 2 O'NEAL& THOMPSON,
supra note 5, § 7:35, at 229.
45. See supra note 44.
46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47. 18OKLA. STAT. § 1065 (2001).
48. 1995 OK 8, 890 P.2d 941.
49. Id. 8, 890 P.2d at 943.
50. Id.
2003]
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C. Oklahoma Shareholder Inspection Rights
The Oklahoma General Corporation Act (OGCA) establishes Oklahoma
shareholders' inspection rights."' The OGCA answers the initial questions
of who, what, where, when, and how. In defining who possesses these
rights, the OGCA defines "shareholder" as a record shareholder in a stock
corporation, or a member shown on the records of a nonstock corporation. 2
The OGCA then provides that by making a written demand under oath
setting out the purpose for the inspection, any shareholder, personally or
through his agent, has the right to inspect the stock ledger, shareholders list,
or other books and records of a corporation and to copy or make extracts
from these documents.5 It also provides that if an agent is to make the
inspection, a power of attorney or other writing authorizing the agent to act
on the shareholder's behalf must accompany his demand.54 It further states
that the demand "shall be directed to the corporation at its registered office
in this state or at its principal place of business."55
If the corporation itself, or one of its agents or officers, refuses to allow
the inspection after a shareholder has made a request, or does not reply to
the demand within five business days, the shareholder may apply to a district
court for an order compelling an inspection. 6 The OGCA provides that the
court may summarily order the corporation to permit the shareholder to
inspect the documents or to furnish him a list of its shareholders as of a
specific date.57 The court may condition the furnishing of such a list on the
shareholder's paying the corporation its reasonable cost for obtaining and
furnishing the list or other appropriate conditions."
51. For a thorough discussion of the Oklahoma statute, see 3B M. THOMAS ARNOLD & H.
WAYNE COOPER, VERNON'S OKLAHOMA FORMS 2D, BUsINEss ORGANIZATIONS, § 12.01, at 549
(West 2001). For generic corporate forms relating to demands for inspection, see id. § 12.07-
.09, at 572-76.
52. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065(A)(1)(a-b) (2001). Courts have sometimes allowed inspection
under the statute of the state in which the shareholder resides instead of the state of the
company's incorporation. See 2 O'NEAL & THOMPsON, supra note 5, § 7:3 5, at 229.
53. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065(B) (2001). If a corporation has equity securities registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, federal proxy rules may provide shareholders
another avenue to access the shareholder list. See 2 O'NEAL& THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 7:35,
at 234 (citing 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1).
54. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065(B) (2001).
55. Id.






Oklahoma law does not define what constitutes "other books and records"
under the OGCA. Some authors have suggested that the Internal Revenue
Code and publications of the Internal Revenue Service offer guidance in
construing this term.59 When dealing with books and records, however,
attorneys should maintain a skeptical mind, as the possibility exists for
management to override internal controls and engage in creative
accounting.6" The broad statutory language invites Oklahoma courts to
construe the term "books and records" to encompass any of the corporate
books, ledgers, or financial records.
The Oklahoma legislature based the OGCA on the Delaware General
Corporations Act.6 Under their principles of statutory construction,
Oklahoma courts should interpret the OGCA in accordance with Delaware
decisions.62 Delaware authorities, therefore, will likely be very persuasive
to Oklahoma courts. This article, consequently, will address inspection
rights in Delaware.
D. Delaware Inspection Rights
Shareholder inspection demands in Delaware operate in a manner nearly
identical to Oklahoma shareholder demands.63 Delaware shareholders have
the right to inspect the stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and other
59. See Michael J. Faul, Jr. & Robert Dipasquale, A Minority Shareholder's Inspection
Rights Under N.J.S.A. 14A :5-28, N.J. LAW., Aug. 2000, at 8,9-13. The authors suggest that the
IRS offers guidance for construing this term in I.R.C. § 6001, which requires "taxpayers other
than wage earners and farmers to keep 'permanent books of accounts or records including
inventories sufficient to establish gross income, deductions, credits and other amounts required
to be shown on any tax return or information return."' IRS Publication 583 may provide similar
guidance for items companies may keep as records. Id. at 11. Nothing suggests that Oklahoma
courts would either accept or reject the IRS definition of "books and records" as coextensive
with the term as used in the OGCA. Compare Estate of Sieber v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2002 OK
CIV APP 25, 41 P.3d 1038 (finding IRS and I.R.C. definitions persuasive in tax arena) with
Heskett v. Heskett, 1995 OK CIV APP 52, 896 P.2d 1200 (rejecting application of I.R.C.
definition of "unrealized receivables" where term used in partnership agreement). See also In
re Sales Tax Protest of West, 1994 OK CIV APP 24, 979 P.2d 263 (rejecting application of
definition of "tangible personal property" as used in sales tax code to use in tax case).
60. See Faul & Dipasquale, supra note 59, at 12-13 (discussing approaches used by creative
corporate accountants).
61. See Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 1992 OK CIV APP 129, T 6, 849 P.2d 1093,
1095.
62. See id.; see also Bank of Lakes v. First State Bank, 1985 OK 81, 9, 708 P.2d 1089,
1091 ("It is a settled rule that where one state adopts a statute from another, it is presumed to
adopt the construction placed upon that statue by the highest court of the other state.").
63. This is not surprising because the Oklahoma legislature borrowed the Delaware
provisions when it enacted title 18, section 1065 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
2003]
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corporate books and records if they make written demand, under oath, on the
corporation stating the purpose of the inspection.' Delaware law places the
burden of proof on shareholders, requiring that they demonstrate a proper
purpose to inspect corporate books and records.65 If a shareholder seeks to
inspect the stockholder list, however, Delaware law places the burden of
showing an improper purpose on the corporation.66 Delaware courts note
that shareholders "mustjustify each category of the requested production"67
and that shareholders seeking inspection bear the burden of proving "that
each category of books and records is essential to the accomplishment of the
stockholder's articulated purpose for the inspection."68 Delaware courts have
also noted that while the legislature may statutorily abridge a shareholders'
right of inspection, this right cannot be "abridged or abrogated by an act of
the corporation."69 For example, Delaware courts have refused to allow
provisions of a merger agreement to abridge a shareholder's right of
inspection."0
III. Statutory Limits on Shareholders' Inspections
A. "Proper Purpose" Limitation
If a shareholder seeks to inspect corporate books and records other than
the stock ledger or list of shareholders, the OGCA provides that the
shareholder must establish that he has complied with the provisions
respecting the manner and form of demand and that the inspection is for a
proper purpose.7' If the shareholder wants to inspect the stock ledger or a
list of shareholders, and has complied with Oklahoma law regarding the
form and manner of demand, the OGCA places the burden of proof on the
corporation and requires that it establish that the inspection sought by the
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2001).
65. See, e.g., Thomas& Betts Corp. v. LevitonMfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026,1031 (Del. 1996).
66. Id. at 1031 n.2.
67. Sec. First Corp. v. United States Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 565 (Del.
1997).
68. Id. at 569.
69. See, e.g., BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Med., Inc., 623 A.2d 85,90 (Del. Ch.
1992) (citing Rainbow'Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359
(Del. 1987)).
70. Id. Companies may still create and implement internal policies or procedures to handle
shareholder inspection requests. Indeed, in litigating equitable shareholder inspection demands,
companies may find such policies helpful, especially if a shareholder who is receiving the
desired materials files a shareholder inspection action to "speed up the process."




shareholder is for an improper purpose.72 The OGCA gives Oklahoma courts
discretionary authority to limit or condition the inspection or to award any
other relief they deem just and proper, and Oklahoma courts may order
books or records or copies thereof under prescribed terms and conditions.
7 3
1. Defining "Proper Purpose" Under Oklahoma Law
As one scholar has noted, the phrase "proper purpose" is a "nebulous term
that has spawned much litigation." 4 The OGCA defines "proper purpose"
as "a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a
shareholder."7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted this term
broadly. In a series of cases under the 1947 Oklahoma Business Corporation
Act,76 the Oklahoma Supreme Court defined "proper purpose" under
Oklahoma law.77 In one case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
a bona fide stockholder has a legal right of inspection in good
faith where he does not seek to gratify curiosity or is not
proceeding for speculative or vexatious purposes. It is also
necessary that the purpose be lawful in character and not contrary
to the interest of the corporation .... The proper purpose required
by the statute, then, is one wherein a stockholder seeks
information bearing upon the protection of his interest and that of
other stockholders in the corporation. He must be seeking
something more than the satisfaction of his curiosity and not
conducting a general fishing expedition. A mere statement in a
petition alleging a proper purpose is not sufficient. The facts in
each case may be examined.78
72. Id. § 1065(C)(3).
73. Id.
74. Aaron C. Viets, Note, Corporate Law - Formulating and Applying a "Proper
Purpose" Analysis to a Books and Records Inspection Request - Schein v. Northern Rio
Arriba Electric Cooperative, Inc., 28 N.M. L. REv. 133, 134 (1998).
75. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065(C)(3) (2001).
76. The 1947 Oklahoma Business Corporation Act was formerly found at title 18, section
1.71 of the Oklahoma Statutes. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1.71 (1961) (repealed 1986).
77. See Fears v. Cattleman's Inv. Co., 1971 OK 22, 9, 483 P.2d 724, 727; Wolozyn v.
Begarek, 1963 OK 35, 11, 378 P.2d 1007, 1010; Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co., 1948 OK
1, 20-21, 189 P.2d 929, 932; Tolkan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 1943 OK 301, IM 11-12, 141
P.2d 571, 574. See generally Griffin, supra note 3 (discussing these cases).
78. Fears, 9,483 P.2d at 727 (quoting Sawers v. Am. Phenolic Corp., 89 N.E.2d 374,379
(II1. 1950)); see also Tolkan Royalty Corp., 11-12, 141 P.2d at 574 (noting that none of these
concerns were present).
2003]
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In another case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the phrase "for any
proper purpose" limited and revoked the unlimited and understood right of
inspection existing under a prior statute.79 In Fears v. Cattleman's
Investment Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a stockholder's
demand for a list of stockholders and addresses was for a proper purpose,
even if the stockholder wanted to solicit proxies from other corporate
shareholders, and even if he made the demand with the intent to gain control
of corporate management."0 Similarly, in Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co.,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that examining corporate books to
ascertain stock value was a proper purpose.' In Wolozyn v. Begarek,
however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not show
a proper purpose where the only grounds for their claim of right of
inspection related to acts of the corporation in influencing the basic dogma,
doctrine, and religious beliefs of a corporate church. 2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not overruled its earlier cases, and no
recent decisions interpret the statutory definition of "proper purpose." This
raises the question of how Oklahoma courts will harmonize these pre-1986
Oklahoma decisions with Delaware decisions on the same point. One
Oklahoma appellate court has stated that Oklahoma courts should interpret
the OGCA in accordance with Delaware decisions.8 ' The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has stated that "[g]enerally, where one state has adopted the
uniform laws or statutes from another state, at the time of such adoption,
decisions from the latter state are persuasive in the former state's
construction of such laws; however, subsequent interpretations placed upon
such laws are not controlling or conclusive." 4 This statement suggests that
Delaware decisions will be persuasive, not controlling, authority. At best,
the amount of weight that Oklahoma courts will give to these decisions is
uncertain.
2. Defining "Proper Purpose" in Other Jurisdictions
Decisions from otherjurisdictions establish that a number of purposes are
"proper purposes" for exercising shareholder inspection rights, including
communicating with other shareholders about matters of common concern,
79. Wolozyn, 111, 378 P.2d at 1010.
80. Fears, 1 16, 483 P.2d at 728.
81. Hoover, 22, 189 P.2d at 933.
82. Wolozyn, 13, 378 P.2d at 1011.
83. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.




investigating corporate mismanagement, and valuing corporate stock.85 As
with Oklahoma courts, 6 courts in otherjurisdictions are reluctant to permit
"fishing expeditions.""7 Courts have, therefore, required potential inspectors
to show "a credible basis to find probable wrongdoing." 8 Courts have also
noted that several purposes are not "proper purposes," including satisfying
one's idle curiosity, harassing the corporation or its managers, pursuing
purely social or political aims, and misusing information obtained. 9
B. Miscellaneous Statutory Limits on Shareholders'Right to Inspect
Three additional statutory requirements limit the right of shareholders to
inspect documents: (1) that the request be in proper form; (2) that the
potential inspector transmit the request through the proper demand process;
and (3) that the request set out a "proper purpose."9 Courts have required
that requests strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines as to the demand's
form for two reasons:9' (1) it furthers "the interest of insuring prompt and
limited litigation"; and (2) the request requires that corporations receive and
consider demands before litigation.92 As a result, Delaware courts have
dismissed actions in which the shareholders did not make the complaint
under oath or filed it less than five days after delivery of demand. 3
Shareholders examining documents other than the corporate stock ledger or
85. See 3B ARNOLD & COOPER, supra note 5 1, § 12.06, at 561-64 (detailingjurisprudence
from several states); I R. FRANKLIN BALOTri & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONSAND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.44 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing Delaware law);
2 ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 220.7.3
(3d ed. 1998) (discussing Delaware law).
86. See Fears v. Cattleman's Inv. Co., 1971 OK 22, 1 9, 483 P.2d 724, 727 (quoted supra
text accompanying note 78).
87. See supra note 85.
88. See Sec. First Corp. v. United States Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 567 (Del.
1997).
89. See Fears, 19, 483 P.2d at 727 (noting this under Oklahoma law) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 78). See generally 3B ARNOLD & COOPER, supra note 51, § 12.06, at 565;
Jeffery C. Clark, Note, Compaq Computer Corporation v. Horton, A Straight Forward
Clarifying Statutory Interpretation of Section 220(B) and (C), 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 622 (1995).
Similarly, courts may deny inspections when the shareholder has possession of the requested
materials. CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982) (citing State ex rel.
Miller v. Loft, 156 A. 170, 172 (Del. 1931)).
90. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065(B)(2001).
91. See Mattes v. Checkers Drive-in Rest., Inc., No. C.A. 17775, 2000 WL 1800126, at * I
(Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2000).
92. Id.
93. Id. at *2.
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shareholders list bear the burden of showing that their inspection is for a
proper purpose.
Scholars note that when circumstances warrant, courts may enter orders
limiting the scope of inspection or limiting its purpose.94 Delaware courts
have recognized that they have the duty to safeguard the rights and
legitimate interests of the corporation and the power to limit or restrict a
shareholder's right of inspection." In addressing statutory inspections,
Delaware courts note that they must strike a proper balance between
providing shareholders "a right to at least a limited inquiry into books and
records when they have established some credible basis to believe that there
has been wrongdoing" and "invit[ing] mischief to open corporate
management to indiscriminate fishing expeditions."96 Delaware courts have
also noted they have "the duty to safeguard the rights and legitimate interests
of the corporation," and that they are "empowered to protect the
corporation's legitimate interests and to prevent possible abuse of the
shareholder's right of inspection by placing such reasonable restrictions and
limitations as it deems proper on the exercise of the right." 9'
Consequently, Delaware courts have reasonably restricted the exercise of
a shareholder's right to inspect, including requiring that the shareholder
consent to a confidentiality agreement before disclosure, emphasizing "the
need to protect privately-held corporations from the dissemination of
confidential business information to curiosity seekers."98 Accordingly,
Delaware courts have restricted a shareholder's inspection to certain
categories of information,99 and have prohibited inspecting parties from
disclosing information obtained in the inspection to competitors.'
94. See, e.g., 3B ARNOLD&COOPER, supra note 51, § 12.06(h), at 571-72.
95. See CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 793-94 (Del. 1982); Sahagen
Satellite Tech. Group, LLC v. Ellipso, Inc., 791 A.2d 794 (Del. Ch. 2000) (exercising this
power to restrict a request for inspection).
96. Sec. First Corp. v. United States Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 571 (Del.
1997).
97. CM & M Group, Inc., 453 A.2d at 793-94.
98. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 89 (Del. 1992) (relying on these principles to reject
claim that directors should have produced confidential information under Delaware shareholders
inspection statute). See generally Clark, supra note 89, at 622-23 (noting that Delaware law
limits these rights and that Delaware courts have emphasized these limits).
99. See Macklowe v. Planet Hollywood, Inc., CIV. A. No. 13450, 1994 WL 560804, at *7-
8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 1994).




In Sahagen Satellite Technology Group, LLC v. Ellipso, Inc., a
corporate stockholder demanded an inspection to investigate waste and
mismanagement allegedly diverting corporate assets and failing to take
advantage of corporate opportunities. It claimed that the President and
C.E.O. of Ellipso, Inc. had used corporate funds to buy a personal computer
from a friend at an exorbitant price, to pay for his personal defense in
governmental inspections, and to pay for personal travel expenses.0 2
Because the corporate shareholders had failed to show that the documents
listed in its demand were "essential and sufficient," the Delaware court
limited the corporate shareholder's inspection to periodic financial
statements and documents related to the company's purchase of computer
equipment.' °3
In CM& MGroup, Inc. v. Carroll,"" the Delaware Supreme Court placed
conditions on the disclosure of information obtained from a shareholder's
inspection. In Carroll, the shareholder sought financial information to value
his stock.'0 5 The court conditioned the shareholder's disclosure of the
information he had received to a prospective purchaser upon the receipt of
written representations and an executed confidentiality agreement.1
0 6
These cases demonstrate the ability of courts to shape equitable solutions
to protect a company. Delaware statutorily vests jurisdiction over
shareholder requests in the Chancery Court, so principles of equity remain
applicable. 7 As a result, equitable defenses' 8 may apply as well as
overarching principles of justice and equity.'0 9
101. 791 A.2d 794, 795 (Del. Ch. 2000).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 796.
104. 453 A.2d 788 (Del. 1982).
105. Id. at 792-93.
106. Id at 794.
107. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001). Although, unlike Delaware, Oklahoma has
dissolved the split between law and equity, these principles still apply to shareholder requests
that are equitable actions, whether the court is a chancellor as in Delaware or a district court
judge as in Oklahoma.
108. As an interesting aside, Delaware courts have held that the equitable doctrine of
"unclean hands" is unavailable in a section 220 action. See Skoglund v. Ormand Indus., Inc.,
372 A.2d 204, 214 (Del. Ch. 1976); 2 FOLK, supra note 85, § 220.10. Whether Oklahoma
courts would reach the same conclusion is unclear.
109. See Cook v. Fusselman, 300 A.2d 246, 251 (Del. Ch. 1972); see also I BALOTI &
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 85, § 7.46.
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IV. Directors'Right of Inspection
Shareholders are not the only class granted inspection rights under the
OGCA. The OGCA also establishes inspection rights for directors."' These
rights are much broader than the inspection rights granted to shareholders.
Consequently, courts note that the right of a shareholder to examine corporate
books is a qualified right, whereas the right of a director is usually termed as
an absolute right."'
A. Rationale
While a shareholder's right to inspect arises out of his ownership of
corporate property, a director's right of inspection "grows out of the fact that
he is a representative of all the stockholders and, in a sense, a managing
partner of the corporation.""' 2 A director's right of inspection also exists
because he is a fiduciary with respect to the corporation and its
shareholders." 3 The right of inspection, therefore, is necessary to allow the
director to perform his duties and to protect himself from liability."4 To meet
his fiduciary obligations, a director must have access to books and records and
often has a duty to consult such documents."' Consequently, Delaware courts
presume that a sitting director is entitled to "unfettered access to the books
and records of the corporation for which he sits and certainly is entitled to
receive what the other directors are given."" 6 As a result, Delaware courts
have noted that "[t]he rights of a stockholder to examine books is often called
110. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1065 (2001).
11. See State ex rel. Dixon v. Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co., 36 A.2d 29, 30 (Del. Super. Ct.
1944); James Ludlum, Jr., Corporate Directors: Their Right to Inspect, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv.
35, 35-36 (1973). See generally I BALoTTi & FrNKELsTEiN, supra note 85, § 7.49; 2 FOLK,
supra note 85, § 220.3.5.
112. Dixon, 36 A.2d at 31. In the context of describing the inspection rights required of
foreign corporations under California law, scholars have noted that broad inspection rights, and
even mandatory inspections, provide corporate insiders with an incentive to fulfill their fiduciary
duties. Michael J. Halloran & Douglas L. Hammer, Section 2115 ofthe New California General
Corporation Law - The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations,
23 UCLA L. REv. 1282, 1323 (1976).
113. Allan Getson, Comment, Director's Right to Inspect Corporate Records, 19 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 281, 283 (1962).
114. See id. at 283; see also I BALoTri& F[nKELSTEIN, supra note 85, § 7.49; 2 FOLK, supra
note 85, § 220.3.5; William C. McLaughlin, The Director's Right to Inspect the Corporate
Books and Records - Absolute or Otherwise, 22 Bus. LAW. 413, 421 (1967).
115. See, e.g.. Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 128 (Del. Ch. 1969).




a qualified right, while the right of a Director is usually termed an absolute
one."' i
B. Oklahoma Directors' Inspection Rights
The directors' absolute right to examine corporate records is embodied in
the OGCA. The OGCA provides that "[a]ny director, including a member of
a governing body of a nonstock corporation shall have the right to examine the
corporation's stock ledger, a list of its shareholders, and its other books and
records for a purpose reasonably related to his or her position as a director." ,"
It also provides that an Oklahoma district court may "summarily order the
corporation to permit the director to inspect any and all books and records, the
stock ledger, and a list of shareholders and to make copies or extracts [of these
records]."" 9 The OGCA also vests the court with discretionary authority to
limit or condition the inspection or to award any relief it deems "just and
proper."' 20 Where a party is both a director and a shareholder, the party must
bring such a suit in his capacity as director.'2'
C. Delaware Directors'Inspection Rights
Because Oklahoma has adopted the Delaware statutes, Oklahoma courts
will likely turn to Delaware authority in addressing this issue. 2 In 1981, the
Delaware General Assembly amended section 220 of its General Corporation
Law to expressly recognize an independent, enforceable right of inspection by
directors.2 3 The Delaware statute provides that by making a demand for
inspection, a director has the right to examine corporate books and records for
a purpose reasonably related to his position as a director.
2 4
Delaware courts presume that section 220 provides sitting directors
virtually unfettered access to corporate books and records. 2 As a result, a
117. Dixon, 36A.2dat3l.
118. 18OKLA. STAT. § 1065(D) (2001).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Other courts have noted that when a party is both a director and a shareholder and
requests privileged information, but sues primarily as a shareholder, that party is not entitled to
the same relief as a director because he did not sue in his capacity as director. See Milroy v.
Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 649-50 (D. Neb. 1995).
122. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
123. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (d) (2001); see also Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock
Exch., Inc., 671 A.2d 874, 876 (Del. Ch. 1994).
124. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2001).
125. See McGowan v. Empress Ent'mt, Inc., 791 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. Ch. 2000); Kortum v.
Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 118 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("As Vice Chancellor Lamb has
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director may inspect virtually any corporate document in existence, provided
the purpose of the inspection is reasonably related to his position.'
2 6
Moreover, once the corporation refuses a director's section 220 demand for
inspection, the director may establish a prima facie case for inspection by
establishing two facts to the court: (1) that he made the demand with a purpose
reasonably related to his position, and (2) that the corporation denied it.'"
From these facts, Delaware courts presume that a showing of entitlement to
the documents has been made, and shift to the corporation the burden of
showing why the court should either deny or condition the director's
inspection. 23
Additionally, Delaware courts note that a director's right of inspection
extends to documents protected by the corporation's attorney-client privilege,
so that "directors have a right to access attorney communications of the
company relating to the time that they served as directors."'29 For example,
in Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Holdings Corp., the Delaware
Chancery Court held that a corporation generally cannot assert the attorney-
client privilege to deny a director access to legal advice given during his
tenure.1
30
D. Limits on a Director's Right to Inspection
Although Oklahoma courts have yet to address the director's right to
inspection in a published opinion, Delaware courts have circumscribed this
right in certain situations by limiting the agents available to assist with
inspections and by making directors accountable for their actions. While
granting directors the unfettered right to inspect corporate documents
stated, there is a 'presumption that a sitting director is entitled to unfettered access to the books
and records of the corporation for which he sits and certainly is entitled to receive what the other
directors are given."') (quoting Intrieri v. Avatex Corp., C.A. No. 16335-NC, 1998 WL 326608,
at * 1 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1998)
126. See supra note 125; see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,1§ 220(d) (2001).
127. Kortum, 769 A.2d at 118.
128. Id.
129. Glidden Co. v. Jandemoa, 173 F.R.D. 459,474 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (applying Delaware
law). Corporations, however, do not waive the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Intrieri, 1998
WL 326608, at *2 (holding that the attorney-client privilege could shield documents reflecting
legal advice given to directors before the party seeking documents became director); Moore Bus.
Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Holdings Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 13911, 14595, 1996 WL 307444, at *2
(Del. Ch. June 4, 1996); Kirby v. Kirby, CIV. A. No. 8604, 1987 WL 14862, at *7 (Del. Ch.
July 29, 1987) (holding that the attorney-client privilege could shield legal advice given to
directors after director seeking inspection left board, and requiring good cause to be shown
before discovery).




reasonably related to their position, Delaware courts may limit the director's
choice of agent when exercising his right of inspection. 3' One court noted
that such a restriction is justified where the proposed agent has a conflict of
interest and the corporation can demonstrate that conflict. 32 It observed that
courts should use the power to limit a director's access to information
sparingly, as the director, not the court, has fiduciary duties to the corporation
and its stockholders. 33 Another Delaware court limited a director's choice of
attorneys where the court found that allowing attorneys who had brought
pending litigation against the corporation to inspect corporate documents
would be "back-door discovery unbound by work-product, privilege or any
other limitation upon discovery."'
134
As a result, where a conflict of interest exists, courts have been willing to
limit the director's choice of agents. Oklahoma courts may adopt this
rationale, as it strikes a balance between limiting efforts to circumvent the
privileges and allowing directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties.
Delaware courts have also circumscribed the director's right to inspect
corporate documents by holding directors accountable for their actions. They
have noted that the corporation has a remedy in court if a director abuses his
position, for example by making information available to an individual hostile
to the corporation, or to individuals not entitled to the information. 1
35
V. Creation of Documents for Inspection by Directors or Shareholders
Under Oklahoma law, shareholders have a broad spectrum of corporate
books, records, and papers available to them. Moreover, directors have a
broader right of examination than shareholders. They may examine any book
or record that is reasonably related to their position as directors. Companies
consequently cannot prevent a director from inspecting the vast majority of
corporate records. Indeed, the scope of the director's inspection may be
limited only upon a showing that a conflict of interest or other legitimate
reason justifying a limitation exists. Occasions will arise, however, in which
directors will find the raw information itself lacking. A director may desire
compilations or analyses of data, or organization of voluminous information
131. See Kortum, 769 A.2d at 120.
132. Id. at 120-21.
133. Id.
134. Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1969).
135. Id. at 129 (noting that such acts violate the director's fiduciary duty and give rise to
legal remedy).
2003]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
into an understandable form. The question remains: Does a corporation have
to prepare documents at the request of the director or shareholder?
This issue is apparently an open one under Oklahoma law. 3 6 Delaware
courts have faced this issue in various contexts in which shareholders have
requested corporate information. Delaware law requires that corporations
prepare certain materials for disclosure and inspection of stockholders.137 In
Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court required
that the company provide its stockholder with a "Cede" list. 3 ' The
corporation could break this list down upon request in a matter of minutes
using modem computer technology.'39 The breakdown disclosed the identity
of brokerage firms holding stock under the name "CEDE & Co." to allow the
holder to trace the beneficial owner and forward the proper materials to
them. 4' The Hatleigh court noted that once a stockholder established a proper
purpose, he was entitled to the same lists and data available to the corporation,
including magnetic computer tapes and daily transfer sheets reflecting stock
transactions.' 4 ' As a result, the court held that the company should disclose
such "Cede" lists because they were readily available and easily produced." 2
The court noted, however, that the corporation was not obligated to prepare
"lists, data, or computer tapes which are not readily available to it and, of
course, [the stockholder] must pay any costs involved."' 43
In analyzing Delaware law relevant to the production of documents for
inspection, Delaware courts have noted that
the Cede breakdown has been viewed as something that can, in
effect, be produced instantly. It is, therefore, available to the
corporation in a proxy contest immediately when needed, even at
136. No reported Oklahoma decision deals with this issue.
137. See Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 428 A.2d 350, 353 (Del. Ch. 1981). See
generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Corporate Documents Are Subject to
Shareholder's Right to Inspection, 88 A.L.R. 3d 663 (1978).
138. Hatleigh Corp., 428 A.2d at 354. Brokerage houses hold stock for their customers'
benefit, with actual title held through an entity known as "The Depository Trust Company,"
which uses the name "CEDE & Co." for this purpose. Id. This practice prevents someone from
ascertaining which brokerage firms hold shares and the number of shares each holds merely by
examining the stock ledger. Id.; see also David W. MacDonald, Comment, The Right to a Nobo
List After Sadler v. NCR Corporation, 5 DEPAL BUS. L.J. 163, 212 (1992) (discussing
thoroughly the procedure for Cede and Nobo lists).
139. Hatleigh Corp., 428 A.2d at 354.
140. Id.
141. Id.





the last moment. Accordingly, it can fairly be said that such
information is, in a real sense, in the possession of the corporation
at all times.'44
In Shamrock Associates v. Texas American Energy Corp.,'45 the Delaware
Chancery Court held that a company that had obtained a list of nonobjecting
beneficial owners of the corporation's stock 46 must provide access to the list
to a record stockholder seeking an inspection. In RB Associates of New
Jersey, L.P., the Delaware Chancery Court rejected a claim by a stockholder
that the court should require the company to produce a Nobo list and provide
it to him." 7 The court noted that a Nobo list differed from a Cede list because
it took approximately ten days to produce and, unlike a Cede breakdown, it
was neither immediately available nor essential to the proxy solicitation
process. 48 As a result, the court held that the shareholder's right to access
information did not extend to compelling the directors to obtain Nobo lists
when the corporation itself had no need for them and had no intention of
obtaining them.'49 The court noted, however, that if the corporation had such
a list or later obtained such a list, it would have to provide that list to the
stockholder.'50
144. RB Assocs. of N.J., L.P. v. Gillette Co., CIV. A. No. 9711, 1988 WL 27731, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 22, 1988).
145. 517 A.2d 658, 660-61 (Del. Ch. 1986).
146. These lists, sometimes referred to as "Nobo" lists, are provided to the company by
registered brokers and dealers according to SEC Rule 14b-l(c). Rule 14b-I provides: "The
broker or dealer shall ... [p]rovide the registrant, upon the registrant's request, with the names,
addresses, and securities positions ... of its customers who are beneficial owners of the
registrant's securities and who have not objected to disclosure of such information .... " 17
C.F.R. § 240.1 4b- I (b)(3)(i) (2001). Rule 14b- I allows corporations to obtain "Nobo" lists and
to contact directly beneficial shareholders, but does not preempt state statutes that potentially
provide access to such lists. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. C.H. Masland & Sons, CIV.
A. No. 86-3295, 1986 WL 6746 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1986). See generally MacDonald, supra
note 138, at 212 (discussing this issue thoroughly and noting that states must interpret their
statutes to determine whether they will broadly construe them to grant access to Nobo lists or
narrowly construe them to limit access to Nobo lists).
147. RBAssocs. ofN.J., L.P., 1988 WL 27731, at *7.
148. Id. at *6.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *7; see Cenergy Corp. v. Bryson Oil & Gas P.L.C., 662 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Nev.
1987) (applying similar logic to reach a similar result); Bohrer v. Int'l Banknote Co., 540
N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (same). But see Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48 (2d
Cir. 1991) (recognizing that shareholders can obtain a Nobo list even if one is not in the
corporation's possession).
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Under Delaware law, the right of inspection of a shareholder extends only
to material which can fairly be said to be in the corporation's possession. 5'
Given that the statute setting out this right includes both the shareholder's
right and the director's right, Delaware courts would likely apply these
principles to the rights of directors as well. Where the corporation neither
needs the document requested nor has the intention of having the document
created, courts refuse to require the corporation to produce the document. 52
This rule, therefore, may extend beyond Cede and Nobo lists to apply to all
corporate books and records.'53
VI. Conclusion
If their client is either a shareholder or a director of a corporation, the
OGCA provides attorneys with another device to use in their quest for
information - corporate inspection rights. While a useful arrow to have in
one's quiver, practitioners must use it at the appropriate time to render it
beneficial. In making that decision, Oklahoma practitioners should examine
two basic interests.
First, practitioners should evaluate the information sought and the party
seeking it. Relevant considerations include whether it is the type of informa-
tion likely to be found in corporate documents, whether the client is a
shareholder or a director, and whether other considerations might limit the
disclosure of information, including the motive of their client in seeking the
information, any potential conflicts of interest, and the like. These factors will
assist practitioners in determining whether such information is available and
obtainable through the exercise of corporate inspection rights. These factors
will also assist practitioners in determining which of the two available avenues
to pursue to exercise the party's inspection rights. Clearly, practitioners
seeking information within the scope of the OGCA may use it to obtain such
information. 54 Their colleagues seeking information beyond the scope of the
OGCA may also obtain the information they seek under the broader common
law inspection rights.'
5
151. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
153. One justification for such a result is that the law should not require the body of
shareholders to bear the cost of benefiting a single shareholder. See generally Fred S.
McChesney, "Proper Purpose," Fiduciary Duties, and Shareholder-Raider Access to
Corporate Information, 68 U. CN. L. REv. 1199 (2000) (describing several economic
approaches to shareholder requests).
154. See generally supra Parts II and II1.




Second, to serve their clients effectively, practitioners should weigh the
need for the information against the potential expense of litigating the request
for inspection. In some cases, the cost of litigating the request for inspection
will outweigh the value of the information sought. Consider the following two
examples. Consider first a party seeking information to value his stock, but
already possessing financials received pursuant to SEC Rule 14-b that contain
the necessary information. In contrast, consider an attorney facing the
potential dismissal of a derivative action for failure to state a claim because
his petition does not illustrate why a demand would have been useless. In the
first case, the attorney certainly could notjustify the expense of litigating the
denial of an inspection request if the financials allowed his client to value his
stock. "'56 In the second case, however, the stakes are much higher, and the
attorney is justified in seeking discovery of as many facts as necessary to
maintain his client's action.
In summary, the inspection rights granted to an Oklahoma shareholder or
director provide Oklahoma transactional and litigation attorneys an effective
tool for gathering information where (1) the client is either a shareholder or
director; (2) the information sought is within the scope of common law or
statutory inspection rights; and (3) the information sought is valuable enough
to allocate resources to exercise these rights.
156. For illustrative purposes, this example ignores the fact that the shareholder may face a
potential legal obstacle to obtaining the inspection because he already has the desired
information.
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